



Press Release: Palestinian Public Opinion Poll Findings

October 7th -11th, 2026

This poll was conducted by the *Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research* headed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki for the *Palestinian Peace Coalition–Two-State Coalition* between 7 and 11 October 2026. It used a representative sample of 1,400 adults in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, interviewed face to face using tablets across 127 population locations or temporary shelters, with a margin of error of $\pm 3\%$.

Overview

A majority supports a political track based on Two-State Solution: 52.7% support a settlement based on a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with land swaps and East Jerusalem as its capital, while 43.5% oppose it. Support is higher for the means of achieving the two-state solution: 55.7% support meetings to exchange views and engage in dialogue with Israeli parties that oppose the occupation, and 54.5% support a regional peace agreement that includes a Palestinian state.

The West Bank and Gaza approach the issue in slightly different way: In the West Bank, 56.1% support the settlement, compared with 38.7% who oppose it. Gaza is divided, with a slight tilt toward opposition: 50.3% oppose it, compared with 47.9% who support it. However, Gaza shows greater support for meetings to exchange views and engage in dialogue: 61.0%, compared with 52.0% in the West Bank.

On obstacles to realize the Palestine State, the occupation comes first, followed by internal division: 53% identify settlement policy (40%) or Israeli security requirements (13%) as the greatest obstacle, while 23% place Palestinian internal division first and 18% cite the weak Arab and international role. Gaza stands out for its emphasis on internal division (32%) and security requirements (20%).

Limited optimism about Gaza's future: 60.6% expect killing, displacement and hunger to continue; 16.5% expect a return to full-scale war; and only 20.8% expect stability and reconstruction in the near future. The West Bank is more pessimistic: 67.5%, compared with 50.7% in Gaza.

Sharp divisions over the technocratic committee: 52% do not expect it to succeed, while 42% do. However, Gaza expresses clear confidence in it (60.4%), whereas the West Bank is skeptical, with only 29.5% expecting success.

Elections are wanted, with reservations about timing: 51.6% support holding elections on schedule without postponement, and 21.5% do not object to a postponement of up to six months.

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This means that 73% support holding elections, compared with 20.6% who oppose holding them either now or in six months.

Gaza is skeptical of the formula but open to practical steps: Approximately half of Gaza respondents oppose the settlement, but they support meetings (61.0%), have confidence in the technocratic committee (60.4%) and accept a limited postponement of elections (30.8%). Gaza therefore appears more inclined toward practical solutions.

Overall conclusion: The results point to a pragmatic yet divided public that supports elections and a political settlement to varying degrees, remains deeply pessimistic about Gaza, and shows a relatively broad preference for an independent list focused on professional competence.

Political Settlement and the Two State Solution

Question 1 Settlement based on a state on the 1967 borders

Overall: 52.7% support, 43.5% oppose and 3.8% have no opinion, giving net support of approximately 9 percentage points.

West Bank: 56.1% support and 38.7% oppose, giving net support of approximately 17 percentage points.

Gaza: 47.9% support and 50.3% oppose. It is the only region where opposition exceeds support, although the difference is small.

This indicates that the two-state solution remains acceptable to a majority, but does not enjoy overwhelming support, with skepticism increasing, particularly in Gaza.

The share expressing “no opinion” is low (3.8%), though somewhat higher in the West Bank (5.2%). This suggests that the public has a clear position on this central issue and does not avoid taking a stance.

Question 2 The greatest obstacle to achieving a Palestinian state

Settlement policy: 40.3% overall (47.1% in the West Bank and 30.5% in Gaza), making it the most prominent obstacle overall.

Palestinian internal division: 22.8% overall (16.6% in the West Bank and 31.6% in Gaza), making it the leading obstacle in Gaza.

The weak Arab and international role: 18.3% overall (19.0% in the West Bank and 17.3% in Gaza), with similar shares in both regions.

Israeli security requirements: 12.7% overall (7.4% in the West Bank and 20.2% in Gaza).

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Other responses account for 2.9% and “no opinion” for 3.1%, concentrated in the West Bank.

This indicates that external factors—settlements, security and the weak Arab and international role—constitute the greatest obstacle for approximately 71% overall, while nearly a quarter see the crisis as internal.

The fact that Palestinian internal division ranks first in Gaza (31.6%) suggests that the public there links unity with the prospect of political progress. This may be reflected in electoral and list preferences.

In the West Bank, settlements remain the leading obstacle by a large margin (47.1%), while Israeli security requirements are cited much less frequently (7.4%) than in Gaza.

Question 3 Meetings to exchange views and engage in dialogue with Israeli parties opposing the occupation

55.7% support and 40.5% oppose, giving net support of approximately 15 percentage points—the highest level of support in this thematic section.

Gaza: 61.0% support and 38.2% oppose. West Bank: 52.0% support and 42.0% oppose, with 6% expressing no opinion.

Notably, Gaza, which shows less support for the final settlement formula in Question 1, expresses the greatest support for dialogue and an exchange of views. This may indicate greater interest in the practical process than in the formula itself.

Opposition to meetings is higher in the West Bank (42.0%) than in Gaza (38.2%). This may reflect the West Bank’s sensitivity toward any contact in the context of settlements and military incursions.

Question 4 A regional peace agreement such as the Arab Peace Initiative

54.5% support, 41.8% oppose and 3.8% have no opinion.

The two regions are similar: support stands at 54.6% in the West Bank and 54.2% in Gaza, while opposition stands at 39.8% and 44.6%, respectively.

A regional agreement enjoys greater support than the settlement formula alone in Question 1—by approximately 2 percentage points overall and approximately 6 points in Gaza. This suggests that an Arab framework increases acceptance of a settlement among some hesitant respondents.

Nevertheless, opposition remains high (41.8%), and is higher in Gaza (44.6%). The Arab initiative therefore does not enjoy a comfortable level of support; its backing remains a narrow and fragile majority.

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Regional Roles

Question 5 The Arab country capable of playing a leading role

Egypt: 27.8% overall (22.4% in the West Bank and 35.4% in Gaza). It ranks highest overall and leads in Gaza.

Qatar: 19.9% overall (23.7% in the West Bank and 14.6% in Gaza). It leads in the West Bank.

Saudi Arabia: 15.2% overall (15.4% in the West Bank and 14.9% in Gaza). Jordan: 11.9% overall (12.2% in the West Bank and 11.6% in Gaza). Both countries receive similar shares in the two regions.

The United Arab Emirates: 10.8% overall, with a substantial regional difference—21.5% in Gaza, compared with 3.3% in the West Bank.

No opinion: 9.7%, concentrated in the West Bank (15.9%, compared with 1.0% in Gaza).

Interpretation: Views are distributed among several countries, with no single country dominating. Roles associated with direct mediation in Gaza, particularly Egypt and Qatar, are prominent, while Gaza respondents give greater weight to the UAE's role.

Question 6 Assessment of Iran's role

36.4% view it negatively, 29.1% positively, 30.6% as neither positive nor negative, and 3.8% have no opinion. This gives a net negative assessment of approximately 7 percentage points.

Gaza: 40.7% negative, compared with 27.3% positive—a net negative assessment of 13.5 percentage points. West Bank: 33.4% negative, compared with 30.4% positive—a net negative assessment of 3 points.

Views are distributed relatively evenly among positive, negative and neutral assessments. This indicates that Iran's role does not command consensus, and that the Gaza Strip, which is directly affected by its consequences, is the most critical of it.

The share answering “neither positive nor negative” (30.6%) is high for a political question. It points to hesitation or a nuanced critical position among approximately one-third of the public, suggesting that polarization over Iran is less acute than commonly assumed.



The Future of the Gaza Strip

Question 7 Gaza's future one year after the ceasefire

60.6% expect killing, displacement and hunger to continue; 16.5% expect a return to full-scale war; 20.8% expect stability and reconstruction in the near future; and 2.1% have no opinion.

The two bleak scenarios together account for 77% overall: 84.7% in the West Bank and 66.1% in Gaza.

Gaza is more hopeful: 33.1% expect stability and the start of reconstruction, compared with only 12.2% in the West Bank. Nevertheless, 50.7% of Gaza respondents still expect suffering to continue.

Question 8 The success of the technocratic committee

51.9% do not expect it to succeed, compared with 42.3% who do; 5.9% have no opinion.

Gaza: 60.4% expect success and 37.9% do not. West Bank: 29.5% expect success and 61.7% do not, with 8.8% expressing no opinion.

The gap between the two regions is approximately 31 percentage points, among the widest gaps in the poll.

The share expecting the committee to succeed in Gaza (60.4%) is much higher than the share expecting stability (33.1%). This suggests that some supporters see the committee as necessary even if its results are not guaranteed.

There is an apparent contradiction between the West Bank's considerable pessimism about the committee—61.7% do not expect success—and its geographic distance from conditions on the ground. This may suggest that West Bank assessments are based more on an overall political judgment than on direct experience, and that Gaza's judgment of actual performance carries greater weight.

Elections and Electoral Lists

Question 9 The timing of legislative elections

51.6% favor holding elections on schedule without postponement; 21.5% accept a postponement of up to six months; 20.6% oppose elections both now and in six months; and 6.3% have no opinion.

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West Bank: 52.2% favor holding elections on schedule, 14.9% accept postponement, 23.6% oppose elections, and 9.2% have no opinion.

Gaza: 50.7% favor holding elections on schedule, 30.8% accept postponement, and 16.4% oppose elections. Thus, 81.4% of Gaza respondents accept holding elections in one form or another, compared with 67.1% in the West Bank.

The results suggest that Gaza is more willing to accept a conditional postponement to ensure broader participation, perhaps because of conditions on the ground. The West Bank is more polarized between insisting on the scheduled date and rejecting elections.

Fatah between stability and decline: Fatah's list receives 14.1%, with similar shares in the West Bank and Gaza. Marwan Barghouti leads in the West Bank (39%), while the list associated with Hamas and Dahlan leads in Gaza (33%). This means that the traditional political space is divided among three poles with regional characteristics, none of which has a balanced national base except Fatah, whose support is limited.

Cross Cutting Analysis and Further Research

The political track is accepted but remains vulnerable (Questions 1, 3 and 4): Support of approximately 52–56% for a settlement, dialogue and a regional agreement constitutes a narrow majority, facing opposition of 40–44%. A list building its platform around the two-state solution would therefore address a relatively cohesive majority in the West Bank, but could face a divided public in Gaza.

Gaza's differing views on the formula and the means (Question 1 compared with Questions 3 and 4): Gaza is less supportive of the settlement (47.9%), but more supportive of dialogue meetings (61.0%). Its support for a regional agreement (54.2%) is similar to the West Bank's. Its interest is therefore focused more on practical mechanisms than final formulas.

Perceptions of obstacles help explain priorities (Questions 2 and 10): The West Bank focuses on the occupation and settlements (47%), which may help explain its greater support for Barghouti's list (39%). Gaza focuses on internal division and security (52% combined), possibly relating to the distribution of votes between the Hamas–Dahlan list (33%) and Masri's list (25%).

Regional roles and voting patterns (Questions 5, 6 and 10): The weight given to the UAE in Gaza (21.5%) coincides with the strength of the Dahlan-backed list there (33%), while Egypt leads in Gaza. Negative assessments of Iran are also higher in Gaza (41%).



Gaza's views on the committee and electoral lists (Questions 7, 8 and 10): Gaza's confidence in the technocratic committee (60.4%), together with support for an independent list of professionals (24.8%) and the Palestinian National Initiative (11.0%), points to an environment receptive to professional and independent leadership. The West Bank, by contrast, is skeptical of the committee (61.7%), yet gives Masri's list almost the same support (23.8%). Support for the independent list therefore does not rest solely on assessments of the committee.

General pessimism and the electoral context (Questions 7 and 9): Although 77% expect bleak scenarios, 73% support holding elections. This suggests that elections are seen as a possible way out of the crisis rather than a political luxury. However, the 20.6% who reject them form a potential base for an electoral boycott.

The balance of Masri's list (Question 10): Its balanced performance in both regions gives it a national advantage, whereas the Barghouti and Hamas–Dahlan lists are regional in character. The independent vote is shared between Masri's list and the Palestinian National Initiative, which together account for 36%. Coordination among elements of this current could therefore change the ranking of the lists.

The Arab role and the settlement (Questions 4 and 5): 54.5% support a regional agreement, but the highest-ranked Arab country, Egypt, receives only 27.8% when respondents are asked which country can play the leading role. The three Gulf countries together account for 45.9%. Acceptance of an Arab framework is therefore not matched by concentrated confidence in any single country. This creates space for multiple mediators and limits any one actor's ability to monopolize the role.

Internal division and postponement (Questions 2 and 9): 31.6% of Gaza respondents link internal division with obstacles to statehood, and 30.8% accept a limited election postponement to ensure broader participation. Both may reflect a desire for inclusive elections, even at the cost of delay. However, this connection remains a hypothesis because cross-tabulation between the questions is unavailable.

A scale of pragmatism: Support rises from acceptance of the settlement in principle (52.7%), to support for practical means (54–56%), to support for holding elections (73%). This suggests that the public is more inclined to accept tangible steps than to commit to final visions.

Similar independent voting preferences in both regions: The two independent lists together receive approximately the same share in the West Bank and Gaza (35.8%). Demand for an independent alternative is therefore linked to the general stance toward existing political forces rather than geography.



Tracking indicators over time: The same questions should be repeated periodically, particularly Questions 7, 8 and 10, to measure the effects of developments on the ground and the technocratic committee's performance on public confidence and the balance among electoral lists.

Further analysis: Cross-tabulate Questions 1, 7 and 8 with Question 10 by region; estimate the margin of error; interpret "other" responses in Questions 2 and 5; and verify the respondent base for Question 10 before adopting the final ranking of lists.

Survey Methodology

Data were collected between 7 and 11 October 2026.

The sample comprised 1,400 adults in the West Bank (909) and the Gaza Strip (488), across 127 population locations or temporary shelters.

Margin of error: $\pm 3\%$.

All interviews were conducted face to face using tablets.

The sample was representative, with its locations selected by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Many inaccessible enumeration areas in the Gaza Strip were replaced with camps and shelters housing residents of those areas.